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Ritual slaughter and religious freedom: Liga van Moskeeën
Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische Organisaties Provincie
Antwerpen, VWZ and others v. Vlaams Gewest, Judgment of the Court of
Justice of 29 May 2018, EU:C:2018:335.
1. Introduction
This case concerns the lack of approved slaughterhouses in the Flemish region
of Belgium (Flanders) to meet the demand for the ritual slaughter of animals
during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice and whether this is a violation of the
right to freedom of religion as recognized by Article 10 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union (hereafter: the Charter). The
Muslim Feast of Sacrifice is a yearly celebration organized by practising
Muslims who consider it their duty to slaughter an animal, or to have an
animal slaughtered, preferably on the first day of the Feast. The meat is eaten
by the family and the remainder is given to the poor and needy, to neighbours,
and to more distant family relatives. Because of the increase in demand during
the Feast, the approved slaughterhouses in some of the Flemish regions do not
have enough capacity. Article 10 of the Charter declares that everyone has the
right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion and this includes the
freedom, either alone or in community with others and in public or in private,
to manifest one’s religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and
observance. This right corresponds to Article 9 ECHR. And, as Advocate
General Wahl points out, “ritual slaughtering has long been recognized in EU
legislation governing the killing of animals as a corollary of religious
freedom”.1 In other words, the slaughter of animals according to religious
rites can be seen as a manifestation of religion, and thus is protected by Article
10 of the Charter. This can also be deduced from Regulation 1099/2009, the
Regulation central to this case, on the protection of animals at the time of
killing.2 Article 4(1) determines that animals shall only be killed after
stunning; however,Article 4(4) then contains an exemption for ritual slaughter
in the following terms: “In the case of animals subject to particular methods of
1. Opinion of A.G. Wahl, in Case C-426/16, Liga van Moskeeën en Islamitische
Organisaties Provincie Antwerpen, EU:C:2017:926, para 1.
2. Council Regulation (EC) 1099/2009 of 24 Sept. 2009 on the protection of animals at the
time of killing, O.J. 2009, L 303/1.
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slaughter prescribed by religious rites, the requirements of paragraph 1 shall
not apply provided that the slaughter takes place in a slaughterhouse”.
The Court of First Instance in Brussels3 asked the ECJ whether, in the
circumstances of the case, Article 4(4) of Regulation 1099/2009 was invalid
because it infringed Article 9 ECHR and Article 10 of the Charter, both
guaranteeing the freedom to manifest one’s religion, and/or Article 13 TFEU,
which contains a duty on the Union and the Member States to mainstream
animal welfare. Therefore, the referring court raised two main issues which
could be in conflict with each other: freedom of religion and animal welfare.
On the one hand, there is the freedom of Muslims in Flanders to manifest their
religion by slaughtering an animal according to religious rites on the first day
of the Feast of Sacrifice, who were hindered in doing so, which could amount
to a violation of their right to freedom of religion. On the other hand, there is
the change in Flemish regulations in relation to ritual slaughter which led to a
lack of capacity in approved slaughterhouses during the Feast of Sacrifice.
Ritual slaughter involves slaughter without stunning the animal first and this
raises animal welfare issues.
The case must be seen against the background of debates in Belgium
regarding the slaughter of animals without stunning. In fact, since 1 January
2019, such slaughter is prohibited in Flanders and a ban in the Walloon region
is set to follow from September 2019. The ban was originally proposed by the
right wing Flemish nationalist minister for animal welfare, Ben Weyts, and
both the Flemish and the Walloon Parliaments unanimously passed a
resolution outlawing such slaughter in 2017. The ban was supported by both
animal welfare advocates and right-wing nationalists and has led religious
minorities in Belgium and other countries to fear that they are the target of
bigotry under the guise of animal protection.4 Belgium has a population of
about 11 million and is home to about 500,000 Muslims and 30,000 Jews, the
groups affected by the ban.5 Both Advocate General Wahl and the referring
court saw the decision of the Flemish regional minister as aiming at animal
welfare. However, Advocate General Wahl appeared to be slightly sceptical
about whether this was the real reason. He commented that “as has been
stressed in discussions at national level, behind the specific question of ritual
slaughtering the spectre of stigmatization very swiftly appears. It is
3. The Nederlandstalige Rechtbank van Eerste Aanleg in Brussels (Court of First Instance
(Dutch-speaking), Brussels, Belgium).
4. See Schreuer, “Belgium bans religious slaughtering practices, drawing praise and
protest”, The New York Times, 5 Jan. 2019: <www.nytimes.com/2019/01/05/world/europe/
belgium-ban-jewish-muslim-animal-slaughter.html> (last accessed 28 Feb. 2019).
5. Ibid.
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historically prevalent and care must be taken not to encourage it”.6 Therefore,
the bans on slaughter without stunning and the issues in this case must be seen
in this political context.
This case comment analyses the case in relation to a number of important
issues: animal welfare; freedom of religion and the relationship between
Article 10 of the Charter and Article 9 ECHR; and, whether a claim of
discrimination on the grounds of religion would have been more successful.
Part of the latter analysis will be the justification and proportionality test
applied in cases of discrimination and to restrictions on the right to freedom of
religion. It is argued that the applicants should have claimed discrimination on
the grounds of religion and the referring court should have asked a question in
relation to such discrimination; this might have led to a different outcome and,
even if it had not led to a different outcome, it might have been more
satisfactory for the applicants as their rights would have been more clearly
taken into account and balanced against the issue of animal welfare. In the
conclusion, the meaning of the case for future cases is addressed.
2. Factual and legal background
Muslims in Flanders complained that the number of approved slaughterhouses
in their region was not sufficient to meet the demand for the ritual slaughter of
animals during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice. This is a celebration organized
each year for three days by practising Muslims who consider it their duty to
slaughter an animal, or to have an animal slaughtered, according to their
religious rites, preferably on the first day of the Feast. The meat of the
slaughtered animal is then eaten by the family, with the remainder being given
to the poor and needy, and to neighbours, and more distant family relatives.
There is a consensus among the majority of Muslims in Belgium that the
slaughter must be done without stunning the animal first, in observance with
religious requirements. At the time of the case and until 1 January 2019, ritual
slaughter normally took place in approved slaughterhouses, but these did not
have the capacity to meet the increased demand for ritual slaughter during the
Feast of Sacrifice. Since 1998, the legislation in Belgium determined that the
minister responsible could approve temporary slaughterhouses each year to
cater for this increase in demand and this had been done. However, in 2014, the
competence in matters of animal welfare was transferred to the regions and,
following this, the Flemish regional minister responsible for animal welfare
announced in a circular that, from 2015 onwards, he would no longer approve
temporary slaughterhouses because these were contrary to EU Regulation
6. Opinion, para 106.
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1099/2009, especially Article 4(4), read together with Article 2(k), according
to which animals subject to particular methods of slaughter prescribed by
religious rites may be slaughtered without stunning only in slaughterhouses
which satisfy the requirements of Regulation 853/2004.7 Article 2(k) of
Regulation 1099/2009 determines that the term “slaughterhouse” means “any
establishment used for slaughtering terrestrial animals which falls within the
scope of Regulation (EC) No 853/2004”. Regulation 853/2004 lays down
specific rules for the hygiene of foodstuffs.
The Flemish regional minister referred, in particular, to the final report on
Belgium from the Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety of the
European Commission which stated that the “killing of animals without
stunning for religious rites outside a slaughterhouse does not comply with
Regulation 1099/2009”.8 The practical effect of the ministerial circular was
that, during the Feast of Sacrifice, there was not enough capacity in the
approved slaughterhouses in some areas of Flanders to meet the demands for
ritual slaughter.
The applicants (various Muslim organizations and an organization of
mosques) brought an action against the Flemish region, challenging the
validity of Article 4(4) of Regulation 1099/2009, read together with Article
2(k), because it clashed with their freedom of religion as guaranteed byArticle
9 ECHR and Article 10 of the Charter and with Article 13 TFEU. Article 13
TFEU reads: “In formulating and implementing the Union’s agriculture,
fisheries, transport, internal market, research and technological development
and space policies, the Union and the Member States shall, since animals are
sentient beings, pay full regard to the welfare requirements of animals, while
respecting the legislative or administrative provisions and customs of the
Member States relating in particular to religious rites, cultural traditions and
regional heritage.” EU Member States are thus under a duty to pay full regard
to animal welfare, but should respect religious rites in relation to animal
welfare.
The referring court observed that ritual slaughter carried out in the context
of the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice falls within the scope of Regulation
1099/2009 because the practice is covered by the concept of “religious ritual”
within the meaning of Article 2(g) and is thus subject to the rule in Article
4(4). Article 2(g) determines that “religious rite” means “a series of acts
related to the slaughter of animals and prescribed by a religion”. The referring
7. Regulation (EC) 853/2004, laying down specific hygiene rules for food of animal origin,
O.J. 2004, L 139/55.
8. European Commission, Directorate-General for Health and Food Safety, Final report
from an audit carried out in Belgium from 24 Nov. to 3 Dec. 2014 in order to evaluate the animal
welfare controls in place at slaughter and during related operations, DG(SANTE) 2014-7059
–MR, 2015, para 49.
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court considered that the implementation of Article 4(4), read together with
Article 2(k), places a restriction on the right to freedom of religion. It
suggested that the restriction was neither relevant nor proportionate with
regard to the legitimate objectives of protection of animal welfare and public
health it pursues, because, first, between 1998 and 2014, the approved
temporary slaughterhouses succeeded in ensuring that animal suffering was
reduced to a sufficient extent and to comply with public health requirements;
and, second, the conversion of these temporary slaughterhouses into
slaughterhouses which complied with the requirements of Regulation
1099/2009 would require very high levels of investment which would be
disproportionate in relation to the temporary nature of the ritual slaughter
carried out there.9 Based on this, the referring court expressed its doubts about
the validity of Article 4(4) read together with Article 2(k) of the Regulation
and, therefore, it asked the ECJ whether these articles were invalid because
they infringed Article 9 ECHR and Article 10 of the Charter and/or Article 13
TFEU.10
3. Opinion of theAdvocate General
Advocate General Wahl started by pointing out that the issue in this case was
not that of a total ban on the killing of animals without stunning, which was a
current topic of debate in several Member States,11 but rather what material
conditions must accompany such slaughtering in order to comply with the
relevant EU rules. The question was thus whether requiring that slaughtering
is carried out in a slaughterhouse as defined in Article 2(k) of Regulation
1099/2009 is a constraint on religious freedom.12
The Advocate General expressed his opinion that none of the arguments
brought forward in the present case impinged on the validity of Regulation
1099/2009. The rule that animals can only be slaughtered in approved
slaughterhouses is a perfectly neutral rule that applies regardless of the
9. Judgment, paras. 22–25.
10. Ibid., para 26.
11. Opinion, para 4. The A.G. writes in a footnote (6) that some EU Member States
(Denmark, Slovenia and Sweden) do not permit ritual slaughter. He also mentions that political
agreement seems to have been reached in the “Flemish and Wallonian [sic] Regions” to prohibit
the slaughtering of animals without stunning from 2019. For a discussion of a proposal for a law
prohibiting animal slaughter without stunning in the Netherlands, see Van Der Schyff, “Ritual
slaughter and religious freedom in a multilevel Europe: The wider importance of the Dutch
case”, 3 Oxford Journal of Law and Religion (2014), 76–102; Vellenga, “Ritual slaughter,
animal welfare and the freedom of religion: A critical discourse of a fierce debate in the Dutch
lower house”, 8 Journal of Religion in Europe (2015), 210–234.
12. Opinion, para 4.
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circumstances and the type of slaughtering chosen. He continued that the
problem here is more a temporary difficulty with the capacity of
slaughterhouses in certain areas during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice, rather
than the requirements arising from EU rules, which strike a fair balance
between, on the one hand, the right to freedom of religion and, on the other
hand, the requirements which flow from the protection of human health,
animal welfare and food safety.13
Advocate General Wahl remarked that the ECJ should avoid engaging in a
theological debate concerning the scope of the religious obligation to
slaughter an animal during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice.14 The Court should
be permitted to restrict its assessment to Article 10 of the Charter;15 and it
should accept, as the referring court had done, that the slaughtering of animals
without stunning on the occasion of the Feast of Sacrifice is indeed a religious
precept or rite that is an expression of religion and that benefits from the
protection of religious freedom.16
Advocate General Wahl then examined whether there was a limitation on
the right to freedom of religion under Article 10 of the Charter. He expressed
his opinion that Article 4(4) of Regulation 1099/2009 could be declared
invalid on account of the protection of religious freedom only if it were
established that the very use of established slaughterhouses was contrary to
certain religious precepts, or if it were demonstrated that the conditions set by
that provision made it objectively more difficult to slaughter animals in
accordance with certain religious rites.17 He concluded that the obligation to
ensure that all slaughter locations are approved was perfectly neutral and
applied to any party that organized slaughtering. Legislation which applied in
a neutral manner, with no connection to religious convictions, could not in
principle be regarded as a limitation on freedom of religion.18
According to the Advocate General, the applicants were ultimately seeking
to rely not only on the derogation for ritual slaughtering, but also on an
additional derogation from the obligation to carry out such slaughter in
approved slaughterhouses.19 He concluded that any problems of capacity were
not caused by Article 4(4) of the Regulation, but were the consequence of a
combination of several specific circumstances entirely independent of the
scope of the provision and arising mainly from a great concentration of the
13. Ibid., para 5.
14. Ibid., para 44.
15. The relationship between Art. 9 ECHR and Art. 10 of the EU Charter will be discussed
below.
16. Opinion, paras. 46 and 58.
17. Ibid., para 75.
18. Ibid., para 78.
19. Ibid., para 82.
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demand for ritual slaughtering at a very precise time of the year and in a very
short period of time. The validity of a provision of EU law should be assessed
according to the characteristics of that provision itself and may not depend on
the particular circumstances of a given case.20 Based on this, the Advocate
General proposed that the ECJ answer the referred question by stating that the
examination of this question has revealed nothing that could affect the validity
of Article 4(4) read together with Article 2(k) of Regulation 1099/2009 in the
light of the right to freedom of religion enshrined in Article 10 of the Charter
and taking into consideration Article 13 TFEU.21
Advocate General Wahl discussed the justification for a possible limitation
on religious freedom in case the ECJ should find that there was such a
limitation.22 This will be discussed in the analysis of the case below.
4. Judgment of the ECJ
The ECJ pointed out that “Regulation 1099/2009 lays down the common rules
for the protection of animal welfare at the time of slaughter or killing in the
European Union”.23 It stated that it would examine the validity of Articles
4(4) and 2(k) of Regulation 1099/2009 under Article 10 of the Charter, as the
ECHR does not constitute, as long as the EU has not acceded to it, a legal
instrument which has been formally incorporated in EU law.24 The Court then
held that the specific methods of slaughter prescribed by religious rituals
within the meaning of Article 4(4) did fall within the scope of Article 10(1) of
the Charter, and that the ritual slaughter at issue here was a rite celebrated by
Muslims to comply with a specific religious precept and was thus covered by
“religious rite” within the meaning of Article 4(4) of the Regulation and fell
within the scope of the Charter.25
The ECJ specified that Regulation 1099/2009 makes clear that in the EU,
ritual slaughter of animals without stunning is authorized by way of
derogation and that this derogation is made in order to ensure effective
observance of the freedom of religion, in particular of practising Muslims,
during the Feast of Sacrifice. By determining that such slaughter needs to take
place in approved slaughterhouses, the Regulation simply aims to manage,
from a technical point of view, the freedom to carry out slaughter without
stunning for religious purposes; this technical framework is not in itself of
20. Ibid., paras. 87–88.
21. Ibid., para 141.
22. Ibid., paras. 90–138.
23. Judgment, para 5.
24. Ibid., para 40–41, with reference to earlier ECJ cases, see below.
25. Ibid., paras. 45–49.
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such a nature as to place a restriction on the right to freedom of religion of
practising Muslims.26 These technical conditions are the same for any animal
slaughter, whether it is ritual slaughter or not, and the rule that this needs to be
done in approved slaughterhouses applies in a general and neutral manner to
everyone who organizes the slaughtering of animals, as the Advocate General
had also observed. This rule thus concerned all producers of meat in the EU in
a non-discriminatory manner. The ECJ also considered that, by laying down
these technical specifications, the EU legislature reconciled compliance with
the requirements of ritual slaughter with those laid down in Regulations
1099/2009 and 853/2004 with regard to the protection of the well-being of
animals at the time of killing, and the health of all consumers of meat.27
Therefore, the rule laid down in Article 4(4), read together with Article 2(k) of
Regulation 1099/2009, did not in itself give rise to any restriction on the right
to freedom of religion, as protected in Article 10 of the Charter, of practising
Muslims during the Feast of Sacrifice.28
The ECJ then mentioned that the referring court took the view that the rule
may hinder the practice of ritual slaughter for many practising Muslims in
Flanders and thus limits their right to freedom of religion. This is because
there is insufficient slaughter capacity to satisfy the demand during the Feast
of Sacrifice. The referring court suggested that this appears disproportionate
in relation to the added value in respect of animal welfare and public health.29
The ECJ pointed out that the validity of an EU measure must be assessed on
the basis of facts and the law as they stood at the time when the measure was
adopted. And, this assessment could not depend on the particular
circumstances of a given case but must take the situation in the entire EU into
account. In this case, the issue concerned only a limited number of
municipalities in Flanders and, thus, it could not be regarded as inherently
related to the application of Regulation 1099/2009 throughout the EU and it
could not affect the validity of that Regulation.The ECJ concluded that the EU
rule does not in itself create any restriction on the right to freedom of religion
of Muslims as guaranteed by Article 10 of the Charter.30
The ECJ then briefly examined the validity of Article 4(4), read together
with Article 2(k) of Regulation 1099/2009, with regard to Article 13 TFEU
and concluded, based on the same considerations as applied to Article 10 of
26. Ibid., paras. 55–59.
27. Ibid., paras. 60–62. This is elaborated on in paras. 63–67.
28. Ibid., para 68.
29. Ibid., paras. 69–70.
30. Ibid., paras. 71–80.
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the Charter, that nothing had been submitted to the Court that would lead to
the conclusion that this rule was invalid with regard to Article 13 TFEU.31
5. Comments
The ECJ followed Advocate General Wahl in finding that there was no
restriction on the right to freedom of religion for Muslims in Flanders during
the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice; both based this on the fact that the rules on the
slaughtering of animals are general and neutral rules, applicable to everyone
who wants to organize such slaughtering, whether this is through ritually
prescribed methods or not. And, again following the Opinion of the Advocate
General, the ECJ held that the validity of an EU law measure could not depend
on the particular circumstances in a given Member State, such as, in this case,
the lack of capacity of slaughterhouses in some municipalities in Flanders. It
is submitted that this finding is correct. However, a number of points can be
made about this case in relation to: animal welfare; freedom of religion and
the relationship between Article 10 of the Charter and Article 9 ECHR; and a,
possibly more successful, claim for discrimination and the issue of
justification of discrimination or of restrictions on the freedom of religion.
5.1. Animal welfare
Apart from questioning the validity of Article 4(4) read together with Article
2(k) of Regulation 1099/2009 in relation to the right to freely manifest one’s
religion, the referring court also asked whether the Regulation was invalid
because it infringed Article 13 TFEU. Article 13, cited above, declares that
animals are sentient beings and that Member States have a duty to pay full
regard to animal welfare in a number of areas. Although both the Advocate
General and the ECJ agreed that the purpose of Regulation 1099/2009 was the
protection of animal welfare at the time of slaughter, neither found it
necessary to examine the issue under Article 13 TFEU in any detail because
the same considerations which applied toArticle 10 of the Charter also applied
to Article 13 TFEU.32 In other words, both concluded that discussion of this
issue was unnecessary given the other arguments.
However, it can be asked whether more attention should have been given to
animal welfare issues. As Ryland and Nurse point out, “the fact that the
promotion of animal welfare is incorporated in the ‘constitutional’ provisions
of the EU Treaties signifies an elevation of animal welfare as a priority issue
31. Ibid., paras. 81–84.
32. Opinion, paras. 49–50, Judgment, paras. 81–83.
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in the EU, alongside other key objectives”.33 On the other hand, the second
part of Article 13 which determines that “the legislative or administrative
provisions and customs of the Member States relating in particular to religious
rites, cultural traditions and regional heritage” must be respected, “makes one
doubt the actual effect of the provision”.34 Sowery confirms this where she
writes, “it is clear that Article 13 TFEU does not bind the Union to prioritize
animal welfare per se”.35
Therefore, should the ECJ and the Advocate General have paid more
attention to animal welfare and Article 13 TFEU in this case? It is submitted
that they did not need to do so. Although the question referred specifically
mentioned Article 13, animal welfare did not appear to play a significant role
in the decision no longer to approve temporary slaughterhouses. From the
facts in this case, the Flemish minister based his decision to stop approving
temporary slaughterhouses on the report by the Commission that such
slaughterhouses did not comply with Regulation 1099/2009, and there was no
indication that his decision was linked to concerns about animal welfare in
these temporary slaughterhouses. In fact, in its report, the Commission held
that although “the killing of animals without stunning for religious rites
outside a slaughterhouse does not comply with the Regulation, the CCA
[Central Competent Authority] has made a big effort to produce the same
animal welfare conditions during religious festivals in regulated sites”.36 This
also indicates that animal welfare in the temporary slaughterhouses was not
the main reason for no longer approving such slaughterhouses. Animal
welfare, thus, did not appear to be a major issue in this case.
Although slaughter without stunning does raise animal welfare issues, as is
clear from the fact that the ECJ recently held that such slaughter does not meet
the highest standard of animal welfare,37 it is submitted that the main reason
for not giving more attention to this issue was that both the Advocate General
and the ECJ were of the opinion that Regulation 1099/2009, by making an
exemption for ritual slaughter, had already struck, as the Advocate General
pointed out, “a balance between freedom of religion, on the one hand, and the
requirements which flow from the protection of human health, animal welfare
33. Ryland and Nurse, “Mainstreaming after Lisbon: Advancing animal welfare in the EU
internal market”, 22 European Energy and Environmental Law Review (2013), 101–115, 109.
See, in the same vein, Zoethout, “Ritual slaughter and the freedom of religion: Some reflections
on a stunning matter”, 35Human Rights Quarterly (2013), 651–672, 662. For a good discussion
of what Art. 13 TFEU means, see Sowery, “Sentient beings and tradable products: the curious
constitutional status of animals under Union law”, 55 CML Rev. (2018), 55–100.
34. Zoethout, “Animals as sentient beings: on animal welfare, public morality and ritual
slaughter”, 7 Vienna Journal of International Constitutional Law (2013), 308–326, 313.
35. Sowery, op. cit. supra note 33, 70.
36. European Commission, report cited supra note 8, para 49.
37. See Case 497/17, Oeuvre d’Assistance aux Bêtes d’Abattoirs, EU:C:2019:13, para 50.
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and food safety on the other”.38 Both also referred to Recital 18 of the
Regulation, which confirms this where it states that “this Regulation respects
the freedom of religion and the right to manifest religion or belief in worship,
teaching, practice and observance, as enshrined in Article 10 of the Charter of
Fundamental Rights of the European Union”.39 Therefore, the Advocate
General and the ECJ did not need to pay extensive attention to animal welfare
issues or balance this with the right to freedom of religion because this
balancing had already been done by the EU legislature itself.
Another reason why the ECJ and the Advocate General did not need to
address animal welfare in more detail is that both held that the validity of an
EU measure could not be affected by the particular circumstances of a given
case. This meant that the particular circumstances in the Flemish region of
Belgium at a specific time could not affect the validity of Regulation
1099/2009. As this held for both Article 10 of the Charter and Article 13
TFEU, the Advocate General and the ECJ were right not to pay more attention
to Article 13 and to issues of animal welfare.
5.2. Relationship between Article 10 of the Charter and Article 9 ECHR
Advocate General Wahl and the ECJ agreed that the validity of Regulation
1099/2009 needed to be carried out in relation to Article 10 of the Charter and
not in relation to Article 9 ECHR. This was based on the fact that:
“whilst, as Article 6(3) TEU confirms, fundamental rights recognized by
the ECHR constitute general principles of EU law and whilst Article 52(3)
of the Charter requires rights contained in the Charter which correspond
to rights guaranteed by the ECHR to be given the same meaning and scope
as those laid down by the ECHR, the latter does not constitute, as long as
the European Union has not acceded to it, a legal instrument which has
been formally incorporated into EU law.”40
According to the Explanations relating to the Charter, the reference to the
meaning and the scope of the ECHR rights are determined not only by the text
of those instruments, but also by the case law of the European Court of Human
38. Opinion, paras. 5 and 94. See also judgment, paras. 56–57.
39. Opinion, para 73; judgment, para 57.
40. Judgment, para 40; see also Opinion, para 47. Both refer to the following: Case 617/10,
Åkerberg Fransson,EU:C:2013:105 para 44; Case 398/13P, Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami andOthers
v. Commission, EU:C:2015:535, para 45; Case 601/15 PPU, J.N. v. Staatssecretaris van
Veiligheid en Justitie, EU:C:2016:84, para 45.
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Rights (ECtHR) and the ECJ.41 This suggests that the ECJ should assess
fundamental rights issues in relation to the Charter and not in relation to the
ECHR, but that it should take the corresponding rights in the ECHR and the
case law of the ECtHR on these rights into account as an aid to interpretation.
Both the ECJ and Advocate General Wahl used this method in this case. It is
suggested that the ECJ felt it necessary to make the statement in the passage
quoted so as to formally separate the two legal systems and to make clear that
EU law and the ECJ are autonomous and that this continues to be the case as
long as the EU has not acceded to the ECHR. This is also clear from J.N. v.
Staatssecretaris van Veiligheid en Justitie, where the ECJ followed a similar
statement with the explanation that Article 52(3) of the Charter “is intended to
ensure the necessary consistency between the Charter and the ECHR without
thereby adversely affecting the autonomy of Union law and . . . that of the
Court of Justice of the European Union”.42 The ECJ, in Liga van Moskeeen,
was thus careful to protect this autonomy, but it also followed Article 52(3)
and the Explanations to the Charter by using the ECHR and the ECtHR case
law in interpreting a number of issues in this case. Therefore, the substantive
influence of the ECHR and the case law under the Convention can be clearly
seen in both the Opinion and the judgment.
It is submitted that using the ECHR and the case law of the ECtHR can be
especially useful in relation to the right to freedom of religion, because of the
extensive case law of the ECtHR in this area, such as the case law on the
definition of the terms “religion” and “belief ”; the explanation of the term
“manifestation”; and, the justification of restrictions on the right to freely
manifest one’s religion. For example, the ECJ observed that the Charter uses
the word “religion” in a broad sense, covering both the forum internum, that is
the fact of having a belief, and the forum externum, that is the manifestation of
religious faith in public.43 The ECJ referred to two of its own cases here,44 but
in those two cases the ECJ had mentioned the ECHR and the terminology is
clearly derived from the ECtHR and wider international human rights law.45
41. Explanations relating to the Charter of fundamental rights, O.J. 2007, C 303/17–35, 33.
See also Case 205/15, Direct¸ia Generala˘ Regionala˘ a Finant¸elor Publice Bras¸ov (DGRFP) v.
Vasile Toma and Biroul Executorului Judeca˘toresc Horat¸iu-Vasile Cruduleci, EU:C:2016:499,
para 41.
42. Case 601/15 PPU, J.N., paras. 45–47.
43. Judgment, para 44.
44. Case 157/15, Achbita and Centrum for Gelijkheid van Kansen and voor
Racismebestrijding v. G4S Secure Solutions NV, EU:C:2017:203, para 28; Case 188/15,
Bougnaoui, Association de Défense des Droits de l’Homme (ADDH) v.Micropole Univers SA,
EU:C:2017:204, para 30.
45. See European Commission of Human Rights, Vereniging van Rechtswinkels Utrecht v.
the Netherlands,Appl. 11308/84,Admissibility Decision, 13 March 1986; id.,VanDenDungen
v. the Netherlands, Appl. 22838/93, Admissibility Decision, 22 Feb. 1995. See also, on the
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Advocate General Wahl and the ECJ also readily accepted that the slaughter
of animals without stunning in order to produce halal meat is a religious rite
for Muslims and thus a manifestation of their religion, which attracts the
protection of Article 10 of the Charter. As the Advocate General pointed out,
this accords “fully with the case law of the ECtHR, in which ritual slaughter is
regarded as a religious practice”.46 The ECJ came to the same conclusion.47
Both referred to Cha’are ShalomVe Tsedek v. France, where the ECtHR held
that “ritual slaughter must be considered to be covered by a right guaranteed
by the Convention, namely the right to manifest one’s religion in observance,
within the meaning of Article 9”.48
Furthermore, neither the Advocate General nor the ECJ found it necessary
to engage with Muslim religious doctrine about the need for slaughter without
stunning.49 It is submitted that this is the correct way for a court to deal with
issues of religion: it is not for a court to rule on the question whether the
stunning of animals prior to slaughter is actually prohibited by the Muslim
faith or whether all Muslims believe this. This, again, conforms to settled case
law of the ECtHR, which has held that “the right to freedom of religion as
guaranteed under the Convention excludes any discretion on the part of the
State to determine whether religious beliefs or the means used to express such
beliefs are legitimate”.50
Therefore, although both Advocate General Wahl and the ECJ formally
separated the legal system of the EU from that under the ECHR and assessed
the validity of Regulation 1099/2009 only in relation to Article 10 of the
Charter, the substantive influence of Article 9 ECHR and its interpretation by
the ECtHR can be seen clearly in both the Opinion and the judgment. This
influence on the interpretation of Article 10 of the Charter is to be welcomed
ECHR, Evans, Manual on the Wearing of Religious Symbols in Public Areas (Council of
Europe Publishing, 2009), 8–9; Murdoch, Freedom of Conscience, Thought and Religion. A
Guide to the Implementation of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights
(Council of Europe Publishing, 2012), 18–23; see, on the global human rights instruments,
Bielefeldt, Ghanea, and Wiener, Freedom of Religion or Belief, An International Law
Commentary (OUP, 2016), pp. 82–85.
46. Opinion, para 60.
47. Judgment, para 45.
48. ECtHR, Cha’re ShalomVe Tsedek v. France,Appl. 27417/95, Judgment 27 June 1995,
para 74.
49. Opinion, paras. 51–59; judgment, paras. 50–51 (referring to paras. 51–58 of the
Opinion).
50. See e.g. ECtHR,Manousakis v.Greece, Appl. 18748/91, Judgment 29 Sept. 1996, para
47; ECtHR, Hasan and Chaush v. Bulgaria,Appl. 30985/96, Judgment 26 Oct. 2000, para 78;
ECtHR, Metropolitan Church of Bessarabia v. Moldova, Appl. 45701/99, Judgment 13 Dec.
2001, para 117; ECtHR, Eweida and Others v. the United Kingdom,Appl. 48420/10, 59842/10,
51671/10, 36516/10, Judgment 15 Jan. 2013, para 81; Vartic v. Romania No 2,Appl. 14150/08,
Judgment 17 Dec. 2013, para 34.
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because it broadens the reach of the right to freedom of religion and because
it has wider application for the Charter – for example, for the interpretation of
“religion” and “belief ” in Article 21 – and beyond. In its first two cases
regarding discrimination on the grounds of religion and belief under Directive
2000/78/EC,51 the ECJ also used the broad definition of these terms given by
the ECtHR and this expands the protection against discrimination as well.52
5.3. Non-discrimination
The argument that Regulation 1099/2009 was not valid based on Article 10 of
the Charter and Article 13 TFEU, was unsuccessful in this case. But it is
argued here that the applicants could and should have claimed that the
requirement of slaughtering only in approved slaughterhouses constituted
discrimination against Muslims, because such a claim might have been more
successful. The referring court could also have asked a different question:
whether the circular of the Flemish regional minister and Regulation
1099/2009 constituted discrimination on the grounds of religion under Article
21 of the Charter against Muslims in certain areas in Flanders, who were thus
prevented from slaughtering an animal during the Feast of Sacrifice due to
insufficient capacity in approved slaughterhouses. The difference between
these two claims is that a claim for discrimination would not question the
general validity of an EU Regulation, but would concern its application to a
specific group. Article 21 of the Charter determines that “any discrimination
based on any ground such as . . . religion or belief . . . shall be prohibited”.
Article 52(1) of the Charter prescribes that restrictions on the rights and
freedoms in the Charter “must be provided for by law and respect the essence
of those rights and freedoms”. Restrictions are “subject to the principle of
proportionality” and “may be made only if they are necessary and genuinely
meet objectives of general interest recognized by the Union or the need to
protect the rights and freedoms of others”. The proportionality and necessity
test means that a balancing needs to take place between all the interests
involved. Article 52(1) applies to both Article 10 and Article 21 of the
Charter.
Does (the application of) Regulation 1099/2009 and the circular of the
Flemish regional minister discriminate against Muslims? In relation to
discrimination, a distinction must be made between direct and indirect
discrimination. Direct religious discrimination occurs where a person is
treated less favourably than another is, has been or would be treated in a
51. Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 Nov. 2000 establishing a general framework for equal
treatment in employment and occupation, O.J. 2000, L 303/16.
52. Case 157/15, Achbita; Case 188/15, Bougnaoui.
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comparable situation, on the grounds of religion or belief.53 Indirect religious
discrimination occurs where an apparently neutral provision, criterion or
practice would put persons having a particular religion or belief, at a particular
disadvantage compared with other persons.54
Regulation 1099/2009 and the circular from the Flemish regional minister
prescribed that the slaughtering of animals could only take place in an
approved slaughterhouse. This rule is a neutral rule which applies to any form
of slaughter, whether this is done according to religious rites or not, as both the
Advocate General and the ECJ pointed out.55 The rule can thus not be seen as
directly discriminating against Muslims or others who want to slaughter
animals according to religious rites. However, it is submitted that the
Regulation can be seen as indirect religious discrimination because it is a
neutral provision applying to everyone equally but which puts Muslims, who
want to ritually slaughter or have ritually slaughtered an animal at the time of
the Feast of Sacrifice, at a particular disadvantage. Indirect discrimination is,
however, not unlawful if it is objectively justified by a legitimate aim and the
means to achieve this aim, are proportionate and necessary.56 This is the same
justification and proportionality test which applies under Article 52(1) of the
Charter.
The referring court considered that the circular of the Flemish regional
minister was a restriction on the freedom of religion because it prevented
many practising Muslims from complying with their religious duty to
slaughter or to have an animal slaughtered on the first day of the Feast of
Sacrifice according to their religious precepts.57 According to the referring
court, this “restriction was neither relevant nor proportionate with regard to
the legitimate objectives of protecting animal welfare and public health that it
pursues”.58 The reasons for this were set out above: the temporary
slaughterhouses offered enough assurance that animal suffering was reduced
to comply with health requirements; and, the high levels of investment
required to convert temporary slaughterhouses into approved ones was
disproportionate to the temporary nature of the demand for slaughter.59
Therefore, the referring court was clearly of the opinion that the interference
was not justified.
Although Advocate General Wahl was of the opinion that there was no
restriction on the right to freedom of religion, he discussed the issue of
53. This definition can be found in Directive 2000/78/EC, cited supra note 51, Art. 2(2)(a).
54. Ibid., Art.2(2)(b).
55. Opinion, para 78; judgment, paras. 60–61.
56. Directive 2000/78/EC, cited supra note 51, Art. 2(2)(b)(i).
57. Judgment, para 23.
58. Ibid., para 24.
59. Ibid.
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justification in case the ECJ did find a restriction and concluded that there
would be no legitimate objective in the public interest to justify a limitation.60
It is useful to examine the Advocate General’s reasoning here as not only can
it be applied to decide on the justification of the indirect discrimination
identified in this case, but it could also assist in future cases where competing
provisions in primary law need to be balanced. It is argued that there were
issues in this case which were not taken into account by the referring court or
the Advocate General and which, if they had been taken into account, might
have led to the conclusion that if there was a restriction, this was justified.
As mentioned, Article 52(1) of the Charter contains three conditions that
have to be met before restrictions on a right or freedom guaranteed in the
Charter can be justified. The first condition is that a limitation must be
provided for by law. This condition does not lead to any problems: as the
Advocate General writes, the limitation in this case, which arises from the
obligation laid down in Article 4(4) of Regulation 1099/2009, undeniably
arises from the law.61
The other conditions in Article 52(1) are that the restriction must fulfil a
proportionality test and it must be necessary to meet general interests
recognized by the EU or to protect the rights of others. According to settled
case law of the ECJ, as referred to by Advocate General Wahl, the principle of
proportionality requires that measures adopted by EU institutions do not
exceed the limits of what is appropriate and necessary in order to attain the
objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question,62 it being
understood that, when there is a choice between several appropriate measures,
recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must
not be disproportionate to the aims pursued.63
Advocate General Wahl pointed out that the obligation to use approved
slaughterhouses pursued the legitimate aims of public policy and public health
objectives, namely animal welfare, public health and food safety.64 These are
general interests recognized by the EU or to protect the rights of others: animal
welfare is a general interest or value recognized by the EU in Article 13
TFEU, as mentioned, while public health and food safety can be seen as
safeguarding public health, another general interest recognized by the EU. It
could also be seen as protecting the rights of others to appropriate standards of
health and food safety.
60. Opinion, paras. 90–91.
61. Ibid., para 121.
62. See e.g. Joined Cases 293 & 594/12, Digital Rights Ireland and Others,
EU:C:2014:238, para 46; Case 601/15 PPU, J.N., para 54.
63. See e.g. Case 101/12, Herbert Schaible v. Land Baden-Württemberg, EU:C:2013:661,
para 29; Case 78/16, Pesce and others, EU:C:2016:428, para 48.
64. Opinion, paras. 93–94. The referring court mentioned the same aims.
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The next question is whether the means used are appropriate and necessary
and no more than necessary. This requires a balancing between the rights of
Muslims in certain areas in the Flemish region of Belgium to manifest their
religion during the Feast of Sacrifice (the problem only exists during that time)
by being able to ritually slaughter or have an animal ritually slaughtered, and
the interests of animal welfare, public health and food safety. Advocate
General Wahl argued that the obligation to slaughter animals only in approved
slaughterhouses “may go beyond what is strictly necessary to attain the
objective of protecting animal welfare pursued when it is a case of
slaughtering an animal in the performance of a religious rite at a very precise
time of the year”.65 He referred to Regulation 853/2004, which lays down
requirements which slaughterhouses must satisfy in order to be approved, and
questioned whether compliance with all those requirements was “necessary in
the very particular context of the momentary increase in the demand for
slaughtering during the Islamic Feast of the Sacrifice”.66 He also stated that
some of these rules seemed superfluous to meeting the peak in demand during
that Feast, as the slaughterhouses in question would be used only once a year
and the meat from the slaughtered animals would, in principle, be given
directly to the final consumer.67 Advocate General Wahl thus appears to
suggest that not all rules laid down in Regulation 853/2004 need to be applied
in these circumstances if this is required to avoid a restriction on the freedom
of religion. He concluded that there certainly exists a less onerous solution
than the obligation to use approved slaughterhouses during the Muslim Feast
of Sacrifice.68 From the previous considerations of the Advocate General, it is
clear that he sees the temporary slaughterhouses which were in place until
2015 as a less onerous solution.69 Therefore, in his view, the means used here
are more than is necessary to achieve the aim pursued and thus the restriction
on freedom of religion is not justified.
However, Advocate General Wahl only considers one alternative – the
approval of temporary slaughterhouses during the Feast of Sacrifice – and
appears to ignore the finding from the Commission that slaughter without
stunning outside approved slaughterhouses does not comply with Regulation
1099/2009. This raises the question whether temporary slaughterhouses are a
viable alternative even if they do fulfil a legitimate aim, and, even if the
Commission found that the relevant authorities had made a big effort to
produce the same animal welfare conditions during religious festivals in
65. Ibid., para 124.
66. Ibid., paras. 125–126.
67. Ibid., para 127.
68. Ibid., para 128.
69. Ibid., para 116. The A.G. referred to the 2015 audit report by the Commission (cited
supra note 8) which “stated that such plants offered sufficient guarantees”.
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regulated sites,70 they do not comply with the Regulation, and converting them
into permanent, approved slaughterhouses would require a high level of
investment. Requiring the State to do so to deal with a very temporary lack in
capacity could be seen as disproportionate, because they are only needed for a
very short period of time once a year.
Moreover, it is submitted that, in assessing whether a limitation on the right
to freedom of religion goes no further than necessary, other alternative ways
of preventing the possible limitation on the freedom of religion of Muslims in
Flanders during the Feast of Sacrifice should have been considered. This is all
the more so as the lack of capacity only arises during three days per year and,
even then, it concerns only a limited number of municipalities in the Flemish
Region.71 Both the Advocate General and the ECJ referred to the ECtHR case
of Cha’are Shalom VeTsedek v. France, but neither mentioned the fact that in
that case it was held sufficient that the Jewish people in France, who, for
religious reasons, wanted to eat only glatt meat, could obtain this from
Belgium.72 In that case, the ECtHR held that the availability of meat from
Belgium meant that there was no interference with the applicants’ freedom to
manifest their religion and thus the ECtHR rejected the application based on
Article 9(1) ECHR.73 It is argued here, as Van Der Schijff does, that it would
have been better if the ECtHR had dealt with this issue when deciding on
justification under Article 9(2),74 but even if the ECtHR had done so, the
outcome would have been the same as the ECtHR explained that any
interference would have been justified under the circumstances.75 However,
the requirement in the case annotated here is to slaughter an animal or have an
animal slaughtered without stunning, rather than just to eat halal meat.
Nevertheless, what was held in Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France can be
applied in this case – and, as mentioned, the case law of the ECtHR must be
taken into account when interpreting the Charter – and this would then raise
the question whether Muslims could have an animal slaughtered in approved
slaughterhouses in other, neighbouring municipalities of Flanders or of
Wallonia, or even in the Netherlands. The circular of the Flemish regional
minister and the recently introduced ban on slaughtering animals without
stunning do not prohibit importing meat from animals slaughtered without
stunning from other countries. It is submitted that this should have played a
role in assessing whether the limitation was justified, whether it was
necessary and proportionate. Approving temporary slaughterhouses was not
70. European Commission, report cited supra note 8, para 49.
71. Judgment, para 73.
72. ECtHR, Cha’re Shalom, cited supra note 48, paras. 80–83.
73. Ibid.
74. Van Der Schijff, op. cit. supra note 11, 91.
75. ECtHR, Cha’re Shalom, cited supra note 48, para 84.
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the only alternative way of ensuring that the Muslim Community in Flanders
could slaughter an animal or have one slaughtered according to religious rites
during the Feast of Sacrifice and these other ways should have been taken into
account as well.
This is relevant for a claim that Regulation 1099/2009 is indirectly
discriminatory for Muslims who want to slaughter or have slaughtered an
animal on the first day of the Feast of Sacrifice in accordance with their
religion, because the test for objective justification of indirect discrimination
also requires a legitimate aim and proportionate and necessary means to
achieve that aim. The same legitimate aims as above can be brought forward in
an indirect discrimination claim as well. In Achbita v. G4S,76 a case
concerning religious discrimination under Directive 2000/78/EC, the ECJ
provided guidance on the requirements for justification of indirect
discrimination. It held that the policy in question must be properly applied in
a consistent and systematic manner; that the policy must be no more than
strictly necessary; and, that an effort should be made to accommodate the
religious manifestation in another way within the company.77 As was already
pointed out, Regulation 1099/2009 is applied in a consistent and systematic
manner to any form of slaughter. Whether a rule or policy is no more than
strictly necessary involves a consideration of alternative, less discriminatory
ways to achieve the legitimate aim(s). These alternatives were also already
discussed.
The ECJ, inAchbita, also suggested that at least some effort should be made
to accommodate the religious manifestation in another way. It can also be
argued that considering alternative, less discriminatory ways of reaching the
same legitimate aim includes at least a consideration of accommodating a
request for religious exemptions from certain rules.78 Support for this can also
be found in the case law of the ECtHR. Article 14 ECHR contains a
prohibition of discrimination on a large number of grounds, including
religion, in the enjoyment of the rights in the Convention. The ECtHR has held
that Article 14 is violated if the discrimination – the distinction made – has no
objective and reasonable justification. To be objectively justified, a difference
in treatment must not only pursue a legitimate aim, there must also be a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and
the aim sought to be realized.79 This test is thus similar to the justification test
76. Case 157/15, Achbita.
77. Case 157/15, Achbita, paras. 40–43.
78. See on this Howard, “Reasonable accommodation of religion and other discrimination
grounds in EU law”, 38 EL Rev. (2013), 360–375.
79. ECtHR, Case Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in
Education in Belgium v. Belgium, Appls. 1474/62; 1677/62; 1691/62; 1769/63; 1994/63;
2126/64) (1979–1980) 1 EHRR 252, under THE LAW, B, para 10.
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inArticle 52(1) of the Charter and that for indirect discrimination. The ECtHR
applied this test in Thlimmenos v. Greece, which concerned a Jehovah’s
Witness who, based on his religious beliefs, conscientiously objected to
military service and who was then convicted for his refusal to wear a military
uniform. When he later passed his chartered accountant exams, he was
refused entry into this profession because he had a criminal conviction. The
ECtHR held that Greece’s failure to treat the applicant differently, its failure to
introduce appropriate exceptions to the rule barring persons convicted of a
serious crime from the profession of chartered accountants, violated his right
under Article 14 ECHR.80 From this it can be deduced that, if no attempt is
made to accommodate a religious manifestation, the means used to achieve a
legitimate aim cannot be considered appropriate and thus there is no
justification for the violation of Article 14 ECHR.
Applying this to the Liga vanMoskeeën case, a claim of discrimination or a
referring question regarding whether the circular and Regulation 1099/2009
constituted discrimination against Article 21 of the Charter, would have had
the advantage that the ECJ would have been obliged to examine the
justification here, including balancing all interests involved and taking into
account whether Regulation 1099/2009 and the circular of the Flemish
regional minister was no more than necessary, and whether there were
alternative ways which were less discriminatory to achieve the legitimate aims
of animal welfare, public health and food safety. This might have led to a
different outcome. But even if this were not the case, the outcome might have
been more satisfactory for the Muslim community in Flanders as their
interests in exercising their freedom of religion would have been considered in
more detail in the justification and proportionality test.
It has been argued that the applicants, rather than contesting the validity of
an EU measure, should have claimed that this measure constituted indirect
discrimination against them on the grounds of their religion, and that the
referring court should have asked whether the application of Regulation
1099/2009 and of the Flemish minister’s circular constituted discrimination
against Muslims in violation of Article 21 of the Charter. However, this leaves
the question whether the ECJ could be expected to solve the gap in the
pleading or should have reframed the question adding a reference to
discrimination. In Costa v. ENEL, the ECJ held that it could extract the right
question even if a question was imperfectly formulated.81 However, it is
suggested that the gap between the two questions was so wide, the two
questions were so different, that it would not have been reasonable to expect
80. Ibid., para 48.
81. Case 6/64, Costa v. ENEL, EU:C:1964:66, 593.
CML Rev. 2019822 Case law
the ECJ to reformulate the question as a completely different question from
the one asked.
6. Concluding remarks
In Liga van Moskeeën, both Advocate General Wahl and the ECJ concluded
that the right to freedom of religion of Muslims in Flanders during the Feast of
Sacrifice was not restricted, because the rules on the slaughtering of animals
were general and neutral rules, applicable to everyone who wants to organize
such slaughtering, whether this is through ritually prescribed methods or not.
Both also concluded that the validity of an EU law measure cannot depend on
the particular circumstances of a given Member State, such as, in this case, the
lack of capacity of slaughterhouses in some municipalities in Flanders, but
that it needs to take the situation in the whole of the EU into account. Both
concluded that Regulation 1099/2009 infringed neither Article 10 of the
Charter nor Article 13 TFEU. It is submitted that this is the correct decision.
Neither the Advocate General nor the ECJ discussed any issues of animal
welfare in detail because of the finding they made on the validity of the
Regulation, and it is argued that they did not need to do so to come to the
conclusion they reached.
The referring court had questioned the validity of Regulation 1099/2009 in
relation to both Article 10 of the Charter and Article 9 ECHR, but Advocate
General Wahl and the ECJ concluded, based on previous ECJ case law, that
Article 9 ECHR did not have to be applied. On the other hand, Article 9 ECHR
and the interpretation of this article by the ECtHR did clearly influence the
interpretation given by the Advocate General and the ECJ to Article 10 of the
Charter and this is, it is argued, a positive development.
It was submitted that it might have been better to argue that Regulation
1099/2009 discriminated against Muslims in particular municipalities in the
Flemish region on the grounds of their religion in violation of Article 21 of the
Charter. Such a claim would not concern the validity of the Regulation, but
would instead challenge its application to a certain group of people because of
their religion. It is argued that Regulation 1099/2009 and the circular from the
Flemish regional minister can be seen as indirectly discriminatory on the
grounds of religion because it is a neutral provision applying to everyone
equally but which puts Muslims in certain municipalities in Flanders, who
want to slaughter or have slaughtered an animal according to their religious
rites at the time of the Feast of Sacrifice, at a particular disadvantage. If
indirect religious discrimination had been claimed, the ECJ would have had to
address the question of justification and proportionality as this applies to both
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Articles 10 and 21 of the Charter. Although Advocate General Wahl did
examine justification, he only considered one alternative way – the approval
of temporary slaughterhouses during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice – of
achieving the legitimate aim pursued. It was submitted that this ignored the
Commission’s finding that stunning outside approved slaughterhouses was
against Regulation 1099/2009, and that he should also have considered
possible other ways of dealing with the increased demand for slaughter
capacity, including whether the Muslims affected could have an animal
ritually slaughtered in approved slaughterhouses in other municipalities of
Flanders or Wallonia or in the Netherlands, following the ECtHR’s findings in
Cha’are ShalomVe Tsedek v. France.
A claim for indirect discrimination or a preliminary question regarding
such discrimination would have entailed the ECJ having to assess the question
whether a fair balance had been struck between all the interests involved: the
interests of animal welfare, public health and food safety; the availability of
alternative ways of dealing with the lack of capacity in approved
slaughterhouses during the Muslim Feast of Sacrifice; the importance of
manifesting their belief through slaughter without stunning for the Muslim
population in Flanders; and the costs of providing possible alternatives. The
test would have involved taking into account whether the circular of the
Flemish regional minister was no more than necessary and whether there were
alternative ways which were less discriminatory to achieve the legitimate
aims. Whether the ECJ would have come to the conclusion that the indirect
discrimination was justified or not, this way of dealing with the issue would
most likely have been more satisfactory for the Muslims involved as it meant
that their right to freedom of religion would have been taken into account in
the balancing test required. So maybe the applicants should have claimed
discrimination on the grounds of religion against Article 21 of the Charter.
The case shows that a challenge that the new laws against slaughter in
Belgium without stunning, or such laws in other countries, are invalid under
Article 10 of the Charter and/or Article 13 TFEU will not be successful, but
that a challenge that this is discrimination against those people who want to
slaughter animals without stunning for religious reasons, might be. Even then,
the ECJ might well find, after balancing all the interests involved, that the
discrimination is justified and proportionate.
Erica Howard*
* Professor of Law, Middlesex University.
CML Rev. 2019824 Case law
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW
Subscription information
2019 Print Subscription Price Starting at EUR 868/ USD 1228/ GBP 619.
Personal subscription prices at a substantially reduced rate as well as online subscription prices
are available upon request. Please contact our sales department for further information
at +31 172641562 or at International-sales@wolterskluwer.com.
 
.
Payments can be made by bank draft, personal cheque, international money order, or UNESCO 
coupons.
Subscription orders should be sent to: All requests for further information
 and specimen copies should be addressed to:
Air Business Subscriptions
Rockwood House
Haywards Heath
West Sussex
RH16 3DH
United Kingdom
Email: international-customerservice@wolterskluwer.com
Kluwer Law International
P.O. Box 316
2400 AH Alphen aan den Rijn
The Netherlands
fax: +31 172641515
or to any subscription agent
For Marketing Opportunities please contact International-marketing@wolterskluwer.com
Please visit the Common Market Law Review homepage at http://www.kluwerlawonline.com 
for up-to-date information, tables of contents and to view a FREE online sample copy.
Consent to publish in this journal entails the author’s irrevocable and exclusive authorization 
of the publisher to collect any sums or considerations for copying or reproduction payable by 
third parties (as mentioned in Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Dutch Copyright Act of 1912 and 
in the Royal Decree of 20 June 1974 (S.351) pursuant to Article 16b of the Dutch Copyright 
Act of 1912) and/or to act in or out of court in connection herewith.
Microﬁlm and Microﬁche editions of this journal are available from University Microﬁlms 
International, 300 North Zeeb Road, Ann Arbor, MI 48106, USA.
The Common Market Law Review is indexed/abstracted in Current Contents/Social & 
Behavioral Sciences; Current Legal Sociology; Data Juridica; European Access; European 
Legal Journals Index; IBZ-CD-ROM: IBZ-Online; IBZ-lnternational Bibliography of Peri-
odical literature on the Humanities and Social Sciences; Index to Foreign Legal Periodicals; 
International Political Science Abstracts; The ISI Alerting Services; Legal Journals Index; 
RAVE; Social Sciences Citation Index; Social Scisearch.
 
COMMON MARKET LAW REVIEW
 
Editors: Thomas  Ackermann, Loïc Azoulai, Marise Cremona, Michael Dougan, Christophe
  Hillion, Giorgio Monti, Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Ben Smulders, Stefaan Van den Bogaert
Advisory Board:
Ulf Bernitz, Stockholm
Kieran Bradley, Luxembourg
Alan Dashwood, Cambridge
Jacqueline Dutheil de la Rochère, Paris
Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Brussels
Giorgio Gaja, Florence
Roger Goebel†, New York
Daniel Halberstam, Ann Arbor
Gerard Hogan, Dublin
Laurence Idot, Paris
Francis Jacobs, London
Jean-Paul Jacqué, Brussels
Pieter Jan Kuijper, Amsterdam
Ole Lando, Copenhagen
Ulla Neergaard, Copenhagen
                                          Miguel Poiares Maduro, Lisbon
Siofra O’Leary, Strasbourg
Sacha Prechal, Luxembourg
Gil Carlos Rodriguez Iglesias, Madrid
Allan Rosas, Luxembourg
Wulf-Henning Roth, Bonn
Eleanor Sharpston, Luxembourg
Piet Jan Slot, Amsterdam
Christiaan W.A. Timmermans, Brussels
Ernö Várnáy, Debrecen
Armin von Bogdandy, Heidelberg
Joseph H.H. Weiler, Florence
Jan A. Winter, Bloemendaal
Miroslaw Wyrzykowski, Warsaw
                         
                                  
                 
                         
  
  
                                       
                               
  
                                                
  
 
 
Managing Editor: Alison McDonnell
 Common Market Law Review
 Europa Instituut
 Steenschuur 25
 2311 ES Leiden
 The Netherlands tel.  + 31 71 5277549
 e-mail: a.m.mcdonnell@law.leidenuniv.nl fax: + 31 71 5277600
Establishment and Aims 
 
 
 
 
Editorial policy 
 
Submission of manuscripts 
Manuscripts should be submitted together with a covering letter to the Managing Editor. They 
must be accompanied by written assurance that the article has not been published, submitted 
or accepted elsewhere. The author will be notified of acceptance, rejection or need for revision 
within three to nine weeks. Digital submissions are welcomed. Articles should preferably be 
no longer than 28 pages (approx. 9,000 words). Annotations should be no longer than 10 pages 
(approx. 3,000 words). Details concerning submission and the review process can be found on 
the journal's website http://www.kluwerlawonline.com/toc.php?pubcode=COLA
© 2019 Kluwer Law International. Printed in the United Kingdom.
The editors will consider for publication manuscripts by contributors from any country. 
Articles will be subjected to a review procedure. The author should ensure that the 
significance of the contribution will be apparent also to readers outside the specific 
expertise. Special terms and abbreviations should be clearly defined in the text or notes. 
Accepted manuscripts will be edited, if necessary, to improve the general effectiveness of 
 
  
  
communication. If editing should be extensive, with a consequent danger of altering the 
meaning, the manuscript will be returned to the author for approval before type is set.
The Common Market Law Review was established in 1963 in cooperation with the British 
Institute of International and Comparative Law and the Europa Instituut of the University 
of Leyden.The Common Market Law Review is designed to function as a medium for the
understanding and analysis of European Union Law, and for the dissemination of legal
thinking on all matters of European Union Law. It aims to meet the needs of both the
academic and the practitioner. For practical reasons, English is used as the language of 
communication.
